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I. INTRODUCTION
The practitioner litigating federal black lung claims once relied
upon the United States Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board
for guidance in both the interpretation of regulations and the def-
inition of legal standards in claims under the Black Lung Benefits
Act.' More and more frequently, however, the various United States
Circuit Courts of Appeal and the United States Supreme Court de-
fine legal standards by which black lung claims are tried. Since 1990,
these courts have increasingly continued to define the standards used
in determining disability due to pneumoconiosis.
* *Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Morgantown, West Virginia; B.A., University of Cincinnat7
1982; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1985.
** Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Lexington, Kentucky; B.S., University of North Carolina, 1973;
M.S., Appalachian State University, 1975; J.D., College of William and Mary, 1984.
1. 30 U.S.C. § 901-945 (1988).
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For claims filed with the Department of Labor on or before 31
March 1980, the United States Supreme Court has resolved the con-
flict which had arisen among the circuits over what proof can be
used to rebut the presumption of disability. 2 However, for claims
filed after 31 March 1980, there still exists a significant conflict
among the circuits as to the standard of disability causation.' In
addition to these disability causation decisions, this Article will dis-
cuss several other decisions which significantly impact the federal
black lung program.
II. REBUTTAL CRITERIA FOR CLAIMS FILED BEFORE 1 APR.L 1980
PAULEY v. BETHENERGY MINEs, INC.
To recognize the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Pau-
ley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., an appreciation of the decisions which
precede Pauley is necessary. As mentioned above, claims for black
lung benefits can roughly be divided between those claims filed on
or before 31 March 1980 and those filed thereafter.4 The regulations
which control the evaluation of claims filed with the Department
of Labor from 30 June 1973, until 31 March 1980, were designed
to replace the eligibility criteria used by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), which had previously been respon-
sible for the evaluation of black lung claims.
The Department of Labor's newly promulgated eligibility criteria
were a result of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977.5 The
Reform Act provided very general guidelines to be utilized, but re-
quired the DOL criteria to be "no more restrictive" than the HEW
criteria employed to evaluate claims filed on 30 June 1973.6
2. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991).
3. See Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 889 F.2d 690 (7th
Cir. 1990) (contributing but necessary cause to disability); Bonessa v. United States Steel Corp., 884
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (pneumoconiosis must be a substantial contributor to disability); Adams v.
IPirector, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 886 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1989) (disabling res-
piratory impairment must be due at least in part to pneumoconiosis).
4. The criteria promulgated to evaluate claims filed with the Department of Labor from 30
June 1973 until 31 March 1980 are provided at 20 C.F.R. Part 727.
5. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(c), 92 Stat. 95 (1978). The Part 727 criteria
are frequently referred to as the DOL interim presumption. The DOL permanent criteria for claims
filed after 31 March 1980 are found at 20 C.F.R. Part 718.
6. 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(2).
[Vol. 94
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The DOL eligibility criteria differ from the HEW criteria in two
important ways.7 First, both eligibility criteria offer a rebuttable pre-
sumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis. To be eligible for
consideration for the DOL presumption, however, a claimant must
have at least ten years of coal mine employment. 8 Second, the HEW
7. The DOL presumption at 20 C.F.R. § 727.203 provides:
§ 727.203 Interim Presumption.
(a) Establishing interim presumption. A miner who engaged in coal mine employment ...
will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis . . if one of the following
medical requirements is met:
(1) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the existence of pneu-
moconiosis (see § 410.428 of this title);
(2) Ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary dis-
ease . . .
(3) Blood gas studies ... demonstrate the presence of an impairment in the transfer of
oxygen from the lung alveoli to the blood...
(4) Other medical evidence ... establishes the presence of a totally disabling respiratory
or pulmonary impairment;
(b) Rebuttal of interim presumption. In adjudicating a claim under this subpart, all relevant
medical evidence shall be considered. The presumption in paragraph (a) of this section shall
be rebutted if:
(1) The evidence establishes that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work
or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title); or
(2) In light of all relevant evidence it is established that the individual is able to do his
usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1) of this title);
or
(3) The evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in
whole or in part out of coal mine employment; or
(4) The evidence establishes that the miner does not, or did not, have pneumoconiosis. 20
C.F.R. § 727.203 (1990).
The HEW criteria at 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 provides:
(b) Interim presumption. With respect to a miner who files a claim for benefits before July
1, 1973 ... such miner will be presumed to be totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis ...
if:
(1) One of the following medical requirements is met:
(i) A chest roentgenogram (X-ray), biopsy, or autopsy establishes the existence of pneu-
moconiosis (see § 410.428); or
(ii) In the case of a miner employed for at least 15 years in underground or comparable
coal mine employment, ventilatory studies establish the presence of a chronic respiratory
or pulmonary disease...
(2) The impairment established in accordance with paragraph (b)(1) of this section arose
out of coal mine employment (see §§ 410.416 and 410.456).
(c) Rebuttal of Presumption. The presumption in paragraph (b) of this section may be
rebutted if:
(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine work or
comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1)), or
(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests ... establish that the individual
is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1))).
8. Note, however, that there is no minimum employment period for miners with radiographic
19921
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interim criteria appear to provide for rebuttal only when the claimant
is performing or is able to perform his or her usual coal mine work. 9
The DOL provisions specifically provide for rebuttal of a pre-
sumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis by establishing that
the miner is performing or is able to perform the usual coal mine
work or by either proving that: (1) the disability or death is not
due to pneumoconiosis; or (2) the miner does not have pneumo-
coniosis. 0
The validity of the DOL criteria used to invoke a presumption
of disability due to pneumoconiosis for miners with at least ten years
of coal mine employment was upheld in Pittston Coal Group v.
Sebben. 1 However, the Court found that for miners with short term
exposure of less than ten years of coal mine employment, the ten
year employment requirement of the DOL criteria violated the no
more restrictive mandate of the Reform Act.' 2 Instead, the invo-
cation criteria of the HEW interim regulations at section 410.490
were to be employed to evaluate the presumption of disability due
to pneumoconiosis for miners with less than ten years of exposure.
While noting that the DOL rebuttal provisions might also violate
the Act, the Sebben Court declined to address the validity of the
DOL rebuttal provisions.'
In light of the Sebben decision and lack of a ruling concerning
the validity of the rebuttal criteria, an almost predictable conflict
arose among the circuits as to the validity of DOL's rebuttal criteria.
The circuits arrived at contrary determinations regarding whether
the rebuttal provisions of the DOL's interim regulations were pro-
hibitively more restrictive, especially when contrasted to the rebuttal
provisions of HEW's interim section 410.490 regulations.
evidence of pneumoconiosis under section 410.490. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) with 20 C.F.R.
§ 410.490(b)(1)(i).
9. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c)(1)-(2). 20 C.F.R. § 410.490 has been referred to as "byzantine,"
"impenetrable," or the result of a scrivener's error. Pauley, IlI S. Ct. at 2535; Pittston Coal Group
v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 129 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
10. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3)-(4).
11. 488 U.S. 105 (1988). In addition to upholding the validity of § 727.203(a)(1)-(4), the Court
in Pittston also rejected the request to reopen and readjudicate nearly 100,000 finally denied claims.
12. 488 U.S. at 120.
13. The respondents in Sebben conceded the validity of the rebuttal provisions. 488 U.S. at
[Vol. 94
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The split occurred over the validity of the third (§ 727.203(b)(3))
and fourth (§ 727.203(b)(4)) provisions of the DOL rebuttal criteria.
It was suggested these provisions - allowing rebuttal by proving
either the absence of pneumoconiosis or that pneumoconiosis did
not contribute to disability - provided methods of rebuttal una-
vailable under section 410.490. These additional rebuttal methods
were viewed to have rendered the DOL rebuttal criteria prohibitively
"more restrictive."
Yet while some circuits rejected this interpretation, 14 others em-
braced it." This conflict was presented to the Supreme Court when
contrary decisions of the Third and Fourth Circuits were granted
certiorari and consolidated for hearing to resolve the issue of stat-
utory construction.1 6
The Third Circuit found the DOL rebuttal criteria not prohib-
itively more restrictive when it addressed the validity of the interim
presumption in BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, Office of Work-
ers' Compensation Programs.1 7 Mr. Pauley worked for thirty years
as a coal miner and, as the parties agreed, had radiographic evidence
of simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The D6L presumption of
disability due to pneumoconiosis was conceded to be established by
radiographic evidence under section 727.203(a)(1). Consequently, the
burden of persuasion shifted to the employer to rebut the pre-
sumption that the miner was disabled due to pneumoconiosis.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the evi-
dence proved pneumoconiosis was not a contributing factor to any
disabling pulmonary condition - the employer having successfully
rebutted the presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis under
section 727.203(b)(3) by proving that disability did not arise out of
coal mine employment.
However, the ALJ then analyzed Mr. Pauley's claim under the
HEW criteria at section 410.490. The presumption of disability due
14. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 890 F.2d
1295 (3d Cir. 1989); Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1989).
15. Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1990); Taylor v. Peabody Coal Co.,
892 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1989).
16. I11 S. Ct. 340 (1990).
17. 890 F.2d 1295 (3d Cir. 1989).
19921
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to pneumoconiosis was again invoked based on radiographic evi-
dence of pneumoconiosis. Here, the ALJ ruled that there was no
evidence to rebut the presumption under sections 410.490(c)(1) or
(c)(2) since the medical evidence demonstrated that Mr. Pauley could
not work. Thus, despite the earlier finding that Mr. Pauley had no
impairment arising from his coal mine employment, the ALJ awarded
benefits, ruling that the presumption had not been rebutted despite
the earlier determination that the miner had no disability arising out
of coal mine employment.
The Third Circuit reversed the ALJ's award of benefits, rea-
soning that it was "perfectly evident that no set of regulations under
[the Act] may provide that a claimant who is statutorily barred from
recovery may nevertheless recover."' 8 The court further stated that
since the purpose of the Act is to provide benefits to miners totally
disabled at least in part due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal
mine employment, 19 it was inconsistent with the purpose of the Act
to award pneumoconiosis benefits when evidence proved there was
no disability arising out of coal mine employment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached
a contrary determination concerning the validity of the DOL rebuttal
criteria, finding the DOL interim rebuttal criteria were more re-
strictive than the "limited" HEW rebuttal methods. Two of the
Fourth Circuit's decisions were consolidated for the Court's review,
in Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co. and Dayton v. Consolidation Coal
Co. 20
The first of these decisions concerned the claim of John Taylor
who applied for federal black lung benefits after working for twelve
years as a coal miner. The ALJ denied the claim, finding no evidence
of pneumoconiosis and that the miner's respiratory disease, chronic
bronchitis, was caused by 30 years of cigarette smoking. The Fourth
Circuit vacated the denial and remanded the case for reconsideration
under the "limited rebuttal" of sections 410.490(c)(1) and (c)(2). The
18. 890 F.2d at 1300.
19. See 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
20. Taylor v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 895 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1990), Dayton v. Consolidation
Coal Co., 895 F.2d 173 (4th Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 94
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss3/5
BLACK-LUNG UPDATE
ALJ was found to have erred by considering whether disability had
arisen out of coal mine employment - a rebuttal method the Court
believed unavailable under section 410.490.
In the companion Fourth Circuit case, Albert Dayton filed for
black lung benefits after working seventeen years as a miner. Al-
though found to be eligible for the DOL presumption of disability
due to pneumoconiosis, the medical evidence was determined to prove
that Mr. Dayton had neither a disabling pulmonary impairment nor
coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The DOL presumption was ruled re-
butted and the claim denied.2'
The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of benefits, reasoning that
the absence of pneumoconiosis was superfluous and had no bearing
on the case, since the HEW regulations do not provide for rebuttal
upon proof of no pneumoconiosis. 22 Thus, the introduction of ev-
idence disputing either the presence of pneumoconiosis or its con-
nection to disability violated the prohibition in the Act on making
the DOL regulations more restrictive than the HEW regulations. 23
The conflicting interpretations of the validity of the DOL's re-
buttal regulations were presented to the United States Supreme Court
in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc. - a consolidated action con-
taining the black lung claims filed by Messrs. Pauley, Taylor, and
Dayton. 24 The contrary interpretations of the DOL rebuttal criteria
presented a conflict affecting as many as 3500 miners' disability
claims valued at as much as $650 million.25
Seven of the eight participating members of the Supreme Court
determined that the DOL rebuttal provisions were not prohibitively
more restrictive than the prior HEW criteria. The majority deferred
to the DOL's interpretation of the intent of Congress in the prom-
ulgation of section 727.203 concluding:
.. that the Secretary of Labor has not acted unreasonably, or inconsistently
with section 402(0(2) of the ... Black Lung Benefits Act, in promulgating interim
21. The presumption was determined to be rebutted under §§ 727.203(b)(3) and (b)(4).
22. 895 F.2d at 175.
23. Id.
24. 111 S. Ct. 340 (1990).
25. The Wall Street Journal, 25 June 1991, Section B, pg. 4.
1992]
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regulations that permit the presumption of entitlement to black lung benefits to
be rebutted with evidence demonstrating that the miner does not, or did not,
have pneumoconiosis or that the miner's disability does not, or did not, arise out
of coal mine employment.26
To invoke the HEW presumption, a claimant must present con-
vincing evidence of radiographic abnormalities (§ 410.490(b)(1)(i))
or ventilatory impairment (§ 410.490(b)(1)(ii)). Moreover, the claim-
ant must also prove "'the impairment established in accordance with
paragraph (b)(1) ...arose out of coal mine employment.' 27
Causation of impairment is defined by section 410.490(b)(2),
which refers back to subparts section 410.416 and section 410.456.28
Subparts sections 410.416 and section 410.456 ease the proof of
disease causation with ten years of coal mine employment by pro-
viding that pneumoconiosis is then presumed to have arisen out of
coal mine employment. 29 Without a minimum of ten years of coal
mine employment, affirmative medical proof that pneumoconiosis
arose out of coal mine employment must be presented.
Thus a miner without proof not only of pneumoconiosis, but
also that pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment, can-
not invoke the HEW presumption of disability due to pneumoco-
niosis20 Such an interpretation is consistent with the Act which defines
26. Pauley, 111 S. Ct. at 2539.
27. 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991); see 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(2).
28. Section 410.416 provides:
(a) If a miner was employed for 10 or more years in the Nation's coal mines, and is
suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be presumed, in the absence of persuasive
evidence to the contrary, that the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.
(b) In any other case, a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis, must
submit the evidence necessary to establish that the pneumoconiosis arose out of employment
in the Nation's coal mines.
Section 410.456 provides:
(a) If a miner was employed for 10 years or more in the Nation's coal mines, and
suffered from pneumoconiosis, it will be presumed, in the absence of persuasive evidence
to the contrary, that the pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.
(b) In any other case, the claimant must submit the evidence necessary to establish
that the pneumoconiosis from which the deceased miner suffered, arose out of employment
in the Nation's coal mines.
29. 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.416(a), 410.456(a) (1991).
30. Short term miners with x-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis gain the benefit of a § 410.490
presumption only if there is direct proof of disease causation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 410.416(b), 410.456(b)
(1991).
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"pneumoconiosis" as a "chronic dust disease of the lung and its
sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising
out of coal mine employment."'" Considerations of existence of
pneumoconiosis and its causal nexus with coal mine employment are
encompassed in the HEW criteria. It follows, then, that DOL could
establish regulatory criteria encompassing both these necessary el-
ements to entitlement - albeit placing these elements in the rebuttal
criteria.
The authorization to promulgate eligibility criteria which gen-
erated from the statute expressly provides that presumptions in ques-
tion will be rebuttable32 and that all relevant evidence must be
considered. 33 The factual scenarios before the Court revealed that
Mr. Dayton had no pneumoconiosis, while Messrs. Taylor and Pau-
ley had no pulmonary disability attributable to pneumoconiosis.
Therefore, an award of black lung benefits to any of these claimants,
who either did not have pneumoconiosis or whose disability did not
arise in whole or in part out of coal mine employment, would have
been contrary to the purpose of the Act.
Furthermore, the Court rejected a cost-benefit argument which
might have "foregone" inquiry into disease existence or disability
of causation. 4 While it was suggested that, by not including elements
of disease existence or etiology of disability under the HEW rebuttal
criteria, a conscious decision was made to forego inquiry into these
areas because of inadequate diagnostic capability, this suggestion,
without adequate legislative or regulatory support, was unpersuasive.
The Black Lung Act simply does not encompass compensation for
those who do not suffer from pneumoconiosis or who are disabled
from causes unrelated to coal dust exposure.
In a lone dissent, Justice Scalia found the majority's analysis
unpersuasive. The dissent emphasized that the HEW regulations pro-
vide only two methods of rebuttal - both relating to the extent of
disability. Existence of disease and causation of disease are not in-
31. 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1988).
32. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1988).
33. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1988).
34. 111 S. Ct. at 2538.
1992]
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cluded.35 However, the DOL regulations authorize four rebuttal
pathways: the two extent-of-disability methods expressed in the HEW
regulations, as well as the two methods allowing rebuttal if the pneu-
moconiosis did not cause the disability or if the miner does not have
pneumoconiosis. Contending that the DOL regulations provided more
opportunities for rebuttal, the dissent argued that since the DOL
criteria are less favorable to the claimant, they must violate the Act's
provision that any DOL criteria adopted should not be more re-
strictive.
Such an analysis, however, is contrary to the mandate that all
relevant evidence should be considered . 6 Moreover, Congress did
not envision these eligibility criteria as unrebuttable presumptions,
since in the same Act Congress created an irrebuttable presumption
of entitlement when complicated pneumoconiosis is proven. 37 The
dissent further does not appreciate that elements of disease existence
and disease causation were included in the HEW criteria as well as
in the subsequent DOL criteria. Finally, it is without consequence
to the validity of the regulatory criteria whether entitlement elements
are to be affirmatively proven by the miner or whether the burden
is placed on the party opposing entitlement to prove the absence of
necessary entitlement elements.
Pauley, therefore, resolves the conflict concerning the standard
of disability causation to be applied to claims filed prior to 1 April
1980, since in claims wherein miners are eligible for presumption of
disability contained at section 410.490 the rebuttal provisions of Part
727 are no more restrictive.38 It is self-evident that if a claimant is
afforded a presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis based
on evidence which suggests, but may not prove, either pneumoco-
35. 111 S. Ct. at 2541.
36. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1988). A denial of the opportunity to rebut a presumption makes such
a presumption irrebuttable and thus inconsistent with the expressed Congressional intent. The Act
provides presumptions (except in the case of complicated pneumoconiosis see infra n.37) which are
rebuttable. 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(1), (2), and (4).
37. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3); complicated pneumoconiosis is an advanced form of pneumoconiosis
which frequently causes respiratory disability or death. See N. Leroy Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide
to Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 721 (1981).
38. 111 S. Ct. at 2539 (1991).
[Vol. 94
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niosis, total disability, or disability due to pneumoconiosis, then
parties opposing entitlement should be afforded the opportunity to
rebut such a presumption with affirmative proof. The presumption
as interpreted by the Court, and as was envisioned by Congress in
the stated purpose of the Act, shifts the burden of persuasion from
a miner to the party (either the Department of Labor or a named
employer) opposing entitlement.
Once the burden is shifted, the party opposing entitlement must
affirmatively prove no disability, that disability did not arise out of
coal mine employment, or that pneumoconiosis not present. Yet
while the parties opposing entitlement are faced with proving a neg-
ative (the absence of pneumoconiosis or absence of disability due
to coal dust), they at least are provided a defense. The Pauley de-
cision therefore preserves the status quo from 1978, upholding the
validity of the DOL regulations which provide a defense to parties
opposing a miner's claim to benefits.
III. DisALiTY CAUSATION FOR CLAIMS FILED AFTER 31 MARCH
1980
A conflict presently exists among the circuits concerning the stan-
dard of disability causation to employ in evaluating claims filed after
31 March 1980.11 The permanent Department of Labor criteria, con-
tained at 20 C.F.R. Part 718, have been interpreted to require: (1)
affirmative proof of pneumoconiosis; (2) that pneumoconiosis arose
out of coal mine employment; and (3) that disability or death is
"due to pneumoconiosis."' 4 The chief source of controversy among
the circuits is the interpretation assigned to the meaning of "due to
pneumoconiosis."41
39. For claims filed from 1 April 1980 through 31 December 1981, there exists certain pres-
umptions based on years of employment as well as the presence of a disabling impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.305. Yet, the criteria to determine the existence of a disabling impairment (§ 718.204) are the
same for these claims during these 21 months as for those claims filed later. Hence, the discussion
of disability causation for these presumption claims is essentially identical to claims filed beginning
in 1982.
40. Grant v. Director, OWCP, 857 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1988); Director, OWCP v. Mangifest,
826 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1987).
41. Perhaps the confusion arises with the use of "due to" rather than "because of." "Because"
is the most direct of the conjunctions used to express cause or reason. It is used to state "an immediate
19921
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The Act provides "'total disability' has the meaning given it by
regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, except
that regulations shall provide that a miner shall be considered totally
disabled when pneumoconiosis prevents him or her from engaging
in gainful employment." 42 The conflict in the interpretation of "due
to pneumoconiosis" can be traced to a Benefits Review Board 1988
decision in Wilburn v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs.43 The standard of disability causation was held to require
proof that "pneumoconiosis is, in and of itself, totally disabling"
- the "in and of itself" standard requiring proof that any pul-
monary impairment due to pneumoconiosis caused total disability."
Such an interpretation of "due to pneumoconiosis" has been uni-
formly rejected by all of the circuits which have considered the proper
standard to utilize in evaluating disability causation.45
The conflict over the meaning of "due to pneumoconiosis" can
be roughly divided between two interpretations of "due to pneu-
moconiosis." One interpretation requires proof that pneumoconiosis
is a substantial contributor or a substantial contributing factor in
the causation of total pulmonary disability.4 A countervailing in-
terpretation adopts a less demanding burden of proof - holding
that a miner must demonstrate a totally disabling respiratory im-
pairment which is caused, at least in part, by pneumoconiosis. 47 Thus,
the conflict in interpretation is between the quantum of disability
and explicit cause." TnE AmsiucAN HERITAGE DicTioNAY 166 (2d ed. 1985). "Due" frequently, and
more appropriately, deals with accounting or financial matters. Id. at 429; see also BLAcK's LAW
DIciONARY 448 (5th ed. 1979).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 902(0(1) (1988).
43. 11 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-135 (1988).
44. Id. at 1-138.
45. For an in depth discussion of those decisions handed down prior to 1990, see Allen R.
Prunty and Mark E. Solomons, Federal Black Lung Update, 92 W. VA. L. Rnv. 849, 855 (1990).
46. Bonessa v. U. S. Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989); Lollar v. Alabama By-Products
Corp., 893 F.2d 1258 (lth Cir. 1990).
47. Adams v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 886 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.
1989); Mangus v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 882 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding if pneumoconiosis is at least a contributing cause, then there is a significant nexus
between pneumoconiosis and the total disability to satisfy the burden of proof); see also, Robinson
v. Pickards Mather & Co./Leslie Coal Co., 914 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1990); Shelton v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 899 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990).
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attributable to pneumoconiosis which serves as a predicate to en-
titlement.
The conflict is dramatically illustrated if a coal worker's pneu-
moconiosis is causing an insignificant or de minimis portion of pul-
monary impairment. The Third and Eleventh Circuit standards reject
de minimis contribution by pneumoconiosis as sufficient to establish
disability due to pneumoconiosis. Other circuits' standards are either
not clear or can be interpreted to hold that a de minimis contribution
is sufficient to establish entitlement.
The Sixth Circuit has adopted an "at least in part" standard for
proving disability.41 However, the court appeared overtly concerned
that miners or their survivors could be awarded benefits where con-
tribution to disability by pneumoconiosis is so insignificant as to be
meaningless. In a footnote, the court noted that nothing in the rec-
ord before it suggested that pneumoconiosis played an infinitesimal
or de minimis part in disability. 49 The Court thus deferred from
addressing whether a de minimis contribution to pneumoconiosis
would support denial of benefits under the Act.
The Tenth Circuit appears to have adopted a de minimis stan-
dard, holding that:
[i]f the pneumoconiosis is at least a contributing cause, there is a sufficient nexus
between the pneumoconiosis and the total disability to satisfy claimant's burden
of proof. This standard is consistent with congressional intent of liberal assistance
to totally disabled coal miners. It is also consistent with nearly twenty years of
court interpretation of the Act in eight different circuits during the course of
three sets of legislative amendments."°
The Seventh Circuit has also struggled with the disability cau-
sation standard, with no consensus within the circuit as to the proper
standard to employ.51 After initially considering and rejecting the
48. Adams v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 886 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.
1989).
49. Id. at 826 n.11.
50. Mangus v. Director, OWCP, 882 F.2d 1527, 1531-32 (10th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original).
51. Compton v. Inland Steel Coal Co., 933 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1991); Collins v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1991); Shelton v. Old Ben Coal Co.,
933 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1991); Newell v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 933
F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1991); Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 899 F.2d
690 (7th Cir. 1990); Hawkins v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 907 F.2d 697
(7th Cir. 1990).
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Board's "in and of itself" standard, the circuit adopted a contrib-
uting cause standard - an all-inclusive standard, interpreted to re-
quire pneumoconiosis to be a necessary, but not sufficient, cause
of the miner's total disability. 2 Thus, applying this standard, the
panel found that mining must be a necessary - but need not be a
sufficient - condition of the miner's disability: if he had not mined,
the miner would not have become totally disabled, although he might
have avoided the disability by care on some other front - by not
smoking, for example. 3
When confronted again with the issue of the disability causation
standard, the Seventh Circuit not only specifically rejected the sub-
stantial or primary cause of disability standard, but also interpreted
the "necessary but not sufficient" causation standard as applying
a simple but/for test to determine disability. 54 Moreover, in a third
consideration of the issue, in Compton v. Inland Steel Co., a three
judge panel presented an unreconsiderable split over the interpre-
tation of the "due to pneumoconiosis" requirement for Part 718
claims. 55
In order to satisfy the causation disability requirement under Part
718, the two judge majority held that pneumoconiosis must be a
contributing cause to total disability. The majority thus adopts the
standard which previously found that coal mining must be a nec-
essary, but need not be a sufficient, causation of the miner's dis-
ability.56 The majority apparently concludes that this standard is a
workable, sensible framework for determining whether disability
causation is satisfied under the Act.
Furthermore, the court recognized that the suggestion that a miner
needs to establish that pneumoconiosis was a "substantial" con-
tributor to disability unnecessarily complicated the legal analysis,
since such an interpretation would inappropriately transform a
52. Shelton, 899 F.2d at 692.
53. Id. at 693.
54. Hawkins, 907 F.2d 697 (rejecting Bonessa v. U.S. Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989)).
55. 933 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1991).
56. 933 F.2d at 480. The disability causation inquiry has been divided into two questions: (1)
is there a disabling impairment; and (2) did pneumoconiosis contribute to that disabling impairment.
See Hutson v. Freeman United Coal Co., 12 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-72 (1988).
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"medical question" into a "legal question. ' 57 The court reasoned
that it is the attending physician who is best qualified to determine
whether pneumoconiosis causes a miner's disability;58 therefore, Ad-
ministrative Law Judges, as triers-of-fact, need only review physi-
cian's medical conclusions and need not be required to make a
medical assessment as to whether pneumoconiosis substantially con-
tributes to a miner's total disability. 59
In a concurring opinion, the ambiguous phrase "due to pneu-
moconiosis" was analyzed based on not only other courts' decisions
but also on the Act, regulations, and applicable legislative history. 60
The purpose of the Act is to provide compensation as a result of
disability or death due to pneumoconiosis. 6 The implementing re-
gulations provide that "no claim shall be approved unless the record
considered as a whole ... provides a reasonable basis for deter-
mining that the criteria for eligibility under the Act and this part
have been met." 62 The statutory definition of disability provides that
disability is established "when pneumoconiosis prevents [a miner]
from engaging in gainful employment requiring the skills and abil-
ities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines
in which [the miner] previously engaged with some regularity and
over a substantial period of time."' 63
While the legislative history supports the conclusion that the Act
was reformed in order to provide compensation for those coal work-
ers' who have pneumoconiosis, 64 the "due to" language further re-
57. 933 F.2d at 482.
58. Id. Such a finding is contrary to prior decisions of this and other circuits. Collins v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 932 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1991); see Peabody Coal Co.
v. Helms, 901 F.2d 571, 572 (7th Cir. 1990). But see Turner v. Director, Office of Workers' Com-
pensation Programs, 927 F.2d 778, (4th Cir. 1991).
59. 933 F.2d at 482.
60. 933 F.2d at 483. Circuit Judge Coffey, who wrote the concurrence, agreed with the ma-
jority's opinion that the trier-of-fact erred in evaluating the standard of disability under Wilburn's
"in and of itself" standard and that the matter should be remanded for further consideration. While
concurring in result, Judge Coffey offers a dissenting opinion as to the framework of calculating
disability due to pneumocoiosis.
61. 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1988).
62. 20 C.F.R. § 718.3(c).
63. 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(A) (1988).
64. 933 F.2d 484-90.
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quires pneumoconiosis to be not simply one of the causes of disability
- but also the primary and substantial cause of disability. The
Seventh Circuit has previously interpreted the HEW regulations (20
C.F.R. § 410.426) to require that pneumoconiosis be proven the
primary reason for inability to engage in comparable work - that
is, in numerical terms, pneumoconiosis must account for a prepon-
derance (more than 50%) of a pulmonary disability.65 Thus, the
"primary and substantial cause" standard alleviates a need for an
ALJ to make conclusions concerning medical findings. Rather, the
ALJ is to analyze physicians' opinions to determine if the weight
of the physicians' opinions persuasively establishes that the majority
of a pulmonary impairment is due to pneumoconiosis. 66
The greatest obstacle to consistent application of the standards
of "necessary but not sufficient cause," "contributing cause," or
"substantial contributing cause" is determining at what point in the
continuum pneumoconiosis becomes a necessary or contributing cause
to disability. Resolution of identical facts by different ALJs could
yield vastly different results. Moreover, a determination that a de
minimis contribution is sufficient under these standards would pro-
vide the opportunity for abuse which Congress tried to prevent in
the amendments to the Act.
For example, one of the concerns acknowledged by the Seventh
Circuit is that the Black Lung Act might provide compensation for
coal miners who also are cigarette smokers and whose disability is
primarily the result of a medical factor other than pneumoconiosis. 67
In such a case, a standard of disability causation where less than
a majority of disability is proven caused by pneumoconiosis would
confer a windfall upon individuals who may have pneumoconiosis
but who do not have a substantial portion of any pulmonary or
respiratory impairment caused by pneumoconiosis.
As suggested by previous authors, the issue of what standard of
causation disability is to be applied is one which may not be able
65. Peabody Coal Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 560 F.2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1977).
66. 933 F.2d at 496.
67. Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 899 F.2d 690, 693 (7th
Cir. 1990).
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to be resolved without a decision by the Supreme Court. 68 As the
Seventh Circuit decisions illustrate, the disability causation issue is
one subject to vastly different interpretations - in part as a result
of the extreme positions taken by the Benefits Review Board and
the various circuit courts.6 9 For example, the Board's standard re-
quiring pneumoconiosis to be the sole cause of disability swings the
pendulum too far in one direction, while the de minimus and "con-
tributing cause" standards adopted by several circuits in reaction to
the "sole cause" standard swings the pendulum too far the other
way?0 The interpretation most consistent with the intent of the Act
and regulations is one that requires pneumoconiosis to be a primary
cause of a disabling pulmonary impairment.
IV. OTHR SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS
A. Application of Developing Medical Technology
In Pauley, the petitioners argued that the HEW regulations con-
ferred a presumption of disability which should be unrebutted by
proof of causation or absence of pneumoconiosis because of in-
adequate medical technology to determine the presence or absence
of pneumoconiosis or the disability due to pneumoconiosis. 7' In the
past two decades, medical technology has continued to develop,
bringing new degrees of sophistication to evaluation of the degree
of respiratory impairment and etiology of pulmonary diseases. And
although not specifically provided for in the regulations, relevant
68. Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, Federal Black Lung Update, 92 W. VA. L. REv.
849, 868 (1990).
69. In light of the various circuit decisions, the Benefits Review Board reversed the prior holding
that "due to pneumoconiosis" required proof that pneumoconiosis was in and of itself totally dis-
abling. Scott v. Mason Coal Co., 14 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-37 (1990). For those circuits who have
specifically considered the disability causation standard to be employed, the Board will employ their
standards. The Benefits Review Board adopts a contributing cause standard in those circuits that have
not considered the meaning of "due to pneumoconiosis." A contributing cause standard was believed
most consistent with the various standards adopted by the different circuit courts.
70. The problem of vastly oscillating interpretations of standards is nothing new to the Federal
Black Lung Program. See infra Section II; Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Worker's Com-
pensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135 (1987); Lukman v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs, 896 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1990).
71. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2532 (1991).
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medical testing must be considered by a trier-of-fact in weighing
evidence of disability. 2
The Fourth Circuit addressed the applicability of diffusing ca-
pacity studies in Walker v. Director, OWCP and Eastern Associated
Coal.73 In evaluating the evidence of pulmonary disability under the
criteria of sections 718.204(c)(1)-(4), the Administrative Law Judge
discredited the validity of the diffusion study and the doctor's opin-
ion resting on that study, since studies of diffusion are not specif-
ically included in the criteria listed to evaluate impairment by the
regulations.7 4 The ALJ found that since the physician had not based
his assessment on any test sanctioned by section 718.204(c), the dif-
fusion study was unreliable.
However, the Fourth Circuit found that the trier-of-fact erred
as a matter of law in failing to consider the results of the diffusing
capacity studies and the physician's opinion based on that study."
The diffusion study must be weighed together with all the other
relevant evidence to determine disability under the eligibility criteria
of section 718.204(c).7 6 The Act requires "all relevant evidence" be
considered and nowhere in the statute or regulations is it suggested
that the list of tests is exhaustive or tests not specifically included
are deemed unreliable. 77
72. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(4) provides where disability cannot be established under the preceding
paragraphs that it may, nevertheless, be established "if a physician exercising reasoned medical judg-
ment, based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, concludes that a
miner's respiratory or pulmonary condition prevents or prevented the miner from engaging in em-
ployment .... "
73. 927 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1991). The carbon monoxide diffusing capacity of the lung (DLCO)
is a test for overall gas exchange that does not require sampling of arterial blood. In conjunction
with other tests, such as spirometry and those designed to measure lung volumes, this test can sen-
sitively detect, during life, the presence of emphysema (destruction of alveolar walls with their as-
sociated capillary vessels) and diseases involving thickening, scarring or inflammation of the alveolar
walls. N. Leroy Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 721
(1981).
74. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c) provides ventilatory and arterial blood gas studies are to be analyzed.
75. Walker, 927 F.2d at 185.
76. Shedlock v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 9 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-195 (1986); Rafferty v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 9 Black Lung Rep. (MB) 1-231 (1986).
77. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, 484 U.S. 135, 139 (1987) reh'g denied 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); Cook v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 901 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Other diagnostic radiographic techniques - such as computer-
ized tomography (CT scans) - and other measurements of dynamic
lung function - such as lung volume studies and alveolar-arterial
oxygen gradients (A-a)02 - although absent from the specified cri-
teria in Part 718, provide information relevant to the disability cau-
sation issue.78 Thus, the results of these studies must be considered
in evaluating physicians' assessments of degree or cause of pul-
monary or respiratory disease.
B. The Prohibition of Section 923(b): To Reread or Not to
Reread
In a case of first impression, the Fourth Circuit was asked to
determine whether section 923(b) of the Act, which limits the use
of x-ray readings procured by the Secretary, also limits x-ray rereads
offered by private employers. 79 The miner contended that an ALJ
erred by not invoking the interim presumption of disability due to
pneumoconiosis because of "improper reliance" upon negative re-
readings of x-rays submitted by an employer. It was alleged that
negative rereadings of x-rays were in violation of the rereading pro-
hibition at 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) which, in pertinent part, provides:
[i]n any case ... in which there is other evidence that a miner has a pulmonary
or respiratory impairment, the Secretary shall accept a board certified or board
eligible radiologist's interpretation of a chest roentgenogram which is of a quality
sufficient to demonstrate the presence of pneumoconiosis ... except where the
Secretary has reason to believe that the claim has been fraudulently represented.0
The suggestion that section 923(b) prohibited rereadings of ra-
diographs by parties other than the Department of Labor was re-
jected by the court, since the contention that section 923(b) could
be interpreted as prohibiting private parties from obtaining reread-
ings is inconsistent with the decisions of the Benefits Review Board,
the Act's legislative history, the implementing legislation, and due
process.
78. Melnick v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 89-2153(BLA) (December 27, 1991).
79. Gray v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 943 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1991).
80. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) (1988).
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The section 923(b) prohibition does not prohibit x-ray rereadings
offered by a private employer. Rather, as the plain language sug-
gests, section 923(b) limits only the Secretary of Labor from ob-
taining additional rereadings when an x-ray is interpreted as diagnostic
of pneumoconiosis by a qualified physician.8 Thus, a flat prohi-
bition against the use of x-ray rereadings would be inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's decision that an ALJ must weigh conflicting
interpretations of the same x-ray in order to determine whether it
intends to prove or disprove the existence of pneumoconiosis.12
By alleging that rereadings submitted by private employers should
be prohibited, the claimant attempted to return to a prior, and in-
valid, interpretation of the interim presumption.83 The interim pre-
sumption of section 727.203(a)(1) was held to be established when
a single piece of credible evidence indicates the presence of pneu-
moconiosis. Under this view, the trier-of-fact was prohibited from
weighing contrary interpretations when a positive x-ray interpreta-
tion was included in the record and the presumption of disability
was invoked as a matter of law. The Supreme Court overruled such
an interpretation, holding that the trier-of-fact need not accept one
positive interpretation and ignore any conflicting interpretations.84
It must now be viewed as resolved that all relevant evidence must
be evaluated by the trier-of-fact in weighing evidence in federal black
lung claims.
C. Who is a Coal Miner?
1. Riverworkers
Whether a riverworker who works on barges and transports coal
or engages in the loading of coal on barges from the shore is con-
sidered a miner under the Act depends on the particular facts of
the case. A two-pronged test has long been employed to determine
81. 943 F.2d at 520.
82. Mullins Coal Co., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S.
135, 148-49 (1987).
83. Stapleton v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 785 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc) rev'd, sub
nom.; Mullins Coal Co., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135
(1987) (allowing a single positive x-ray interpretation to invoke a presumption of pneumoconiosis).
84. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135
(1987).
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whether an employee is a miner under the Black Lung Act. The
employee must have worked in and around a coal mine (situs re-
quirement) and have been employed in the extraction or preparation
of coal (function requirement). 5 An AL's determination that a riv-
erman, who loads coal onto barges at a dock loading facility, is not
a coal miner was upheld as rational. 6
Coal is not considered as being beyond the preparation stage
until it is processed and prepared for market,87 and coal which is
processed and blended at other facilities and then shipped to the
dock loading facility has been determined to be beyond the scope
of extraction or preparation of coal encompassed by the Act.88 Thus,
coal which has been placed on barges has already been prepared for
market and has entered the stream of commerce. The fact that a
riverman worked at a dockhouse loading facility located only 300
yards from the preparation plant was found to be insufficient cause
to overturn the AL's finding that the individual did not work in
and around a coal mine, since the work was not that of the ex-
traction or preparation of coal.8 9
However, the Third Circuit has found that a riverworker, who
worked on a tug crew that loaded coal from a preparation plant
and then travelled with coal to the delivery site, was a miner under
the Act.9° This work was held to be a necessary part of the prep-
aration of coal to be introduced into the stream of commerce, since
the riverworker worked with coal which was loaded onto barges
directly out of a preparation plant - a situation distinguishable
from the riverworker who works with coal shipped some distance
from the preparation plant.91
85. Eplion v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 794 F.2d 935, 937 (4th
Cir. 1986); Amigo Smokeless Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 646
F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1981).
86. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Consolidation Coal Co., 923 F.2d
38, (4th Cir. 1991).
87. Collins v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 795 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.
1986).
88. Consolidation Coal Co., 923 F.2d at 41.
89. Id.
90. Hanna v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 860 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988).
91. Consolidation Coal Co., 923 F.2d at 41.
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Both decisions are consistent with a prior Fourth Circuit decision,
holding that employees who hauled slate from a tipple were not coal
miners.92 The Court held:
traditionally ... the tipple marks the demarkation point between the mining and
marketing of coal. It is at that structure that screening of the coal occurs and
the final product is loaded for transport. When coal leaves the tipple, extraction
and preparation are complete and it is entering the stream of commerce. While
individuals who come in contact with the coal at this interval or later may still
suffer harmful exposure to coal dust, they are not within the class protected by
the black lung statute.93
While reaching what appears to be inconsistent results, these de-
cisions are nonetheless consistent. The ultimate determination of
whether an employee is a miner rests within the discretion of the
ALJ,94 and ALJs may in fact reach different conclusions as to cov-
erage under the Act even when the situations are factually similar.
2. Railroad Employees
Generally, when coal leaves a preparation plant, it is considered
to have entered the stream of commerce and has left the coal mining
process. 95 Transportation workers have typically been construed as
falling within the class protected by the Act only when they are
engaged in the transportation of raw or unprocessed coal which has
not been introduced into the stream of commerce.96 When asked to
determine if a railroad worker met the test, the Fourth Circuit up-
held an ALJ's decision finding a railroad worker was a coal miner.97
Finding that the railroad worker met the "function" and "situs"
tests, the worker was thus determined to be eligible for consideration
for black lung benefits. Rather than looking at the nature of the
92. Collins v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 795 F.2d 368 (4th Cir.
1986).
93. Id. at 372.
94. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Consolidation Coal Co., 884 F.2d
926, 935 (6th Cir. 1989).
95. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Roberson, 918 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1990); Collins, 795 F.2d
at 368.
96. Mitchell v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 855 F.2d 485, 490 (7th
Cir. 1988).
97. Roberson, 918 F.2d at 1144.
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employer's business, the trier-of-fact as well as the subsequent ap-
pellate tribunals were influenced by the employee's status and whether
the employee's work qualified for that as a miner. Although af-
firming the decision that this employee was a miner, the court noted
that the scope of the decision is limited:
•.. in the ordinary case, a railroad employee engaged in the transportation of
coal may well not qualify for benefits under the Act. The demanding tests of
function and situs must be met, as they were in this case. After the coal is prepared
and reloaded for shipment, a railroad employee would not satisfy the function
test. And the possibility of satisfying the situs requirement diminishes as the dis-
tance traveled on the rails increases, rendering the employment other than 'in
around a coal mine.' If a claimant fulfills all the statutory requirements, however,
as Roberson has here, we decline to hold that his status as a railroad employee
negates his recovery of benefits under the Act .... 93
After two decades, the question of who is a miner under the Act
is still not clearly delineated. However, the Act has been interpreted
expansively, and more often than not the definition has been ex-
panded to include the individual who has filed for benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Black Lung Program continues to evolve. Its stated
purpose - to provide disability benefits - is misunderstood and
frequently misconstrued to be a miner's pension. 99 As vividly illus-
trated by the current debate concerning the proper standard of dis-
ability causation under 20 C.F.R. Part 718, the program has been
subjected to wide variances in the interpretation of the applicable
regulations.
The program seems subject to vastly different interpretations given
the emotional nature of its subject. Despite the wildly swinging pen-
dulum of shifting standards, however, the program has generally
returned to an equilibrium to provide a fair hearing for both those
who file claims and those who defend against those claims. While
beyond the scope of this Article, the greatest weakness of the pro-
98. Id. at 1150.
99. Ted G. Logan, The Curse of Coal, TnE, Nov. 4, 1991, at 54.
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gram remains with the provisions which prohibit claimants from
retaining and paying for legal counsel.'0°
100. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990).
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